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Abstract: 
Internet use provides an increasing amount of data that has potential value for 
managers and policy makers. However, without a precise understanding of the 
meaning of data, erroneous conclusions may be drawn which could adversely affect 
future decisions made by managers.  
 
The aim of this paper is to reveal to stakeholders the weaknesses and biases of reports 
which use analysis from large data sets and to highlight key areas and questions they 
may ask. 
 
This paper examines empirical research in the music industry and critiques a report 
using ‘clickstream data’, a data source that collects information on the navigation 
patterns of Internet users through the ‘clicks’ they make on website.  
 
The paper focuses critique on a report published by the European Commission which 
provides analytically weak and potentially industry damaging conclusions about the 
relationship between file sharing activity and purchasing behaviour.  
 
Keywords– Music Industry, File Sharing, Constructive Critique. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under consideration for publication in “Strategic Change” 
 
 
Introduction 
As individuals spend more time online, large data sets providing detail of their 
activities, preference and likes are becoming available for analysis. The results of 
analysis of such ‘big data’ are increasingly used to inform strategic decisions 
(Strategic Direction, 2013). Whilst analysis of big data provides valuable insight for 
strategy, the complexity of analysis means that any theoretical weaknesses in such 
analysis can create misleading conclusions.  This paper focusses upon one particularly 
interesting and valuable ‘big data’ source, clickstream data, and uses a published EU 
Commission Joint Research Centre report (Aguiar and Martens, 2013) as an exemplar 
of the potential issues that imprecision in the usage of data can have for decision 
makers.  
An Internet users activity (i.e. webpages visited) may be captured in a 
computer register and used to generate datasets, usually described as clickstream data. 
Clickstream data reports page views, so is useful in charting a journey of a user as 
they navigate through the internet and in further gaining information of the users’ 
potential interests. Clickstream datasets are potentially valuable for companies and 
governments as data that gathered is richer than traditional customer survey data as 
customers' online browsing behaviour can be followed extensively, creating very 
large datasets. However, it does not capture the context of use, such as actual activity 
on a page, any user interpretation of content, the users intent or the value they seek to 
gain from the experience when on a webpage (Bucklin and Sismeiro, 2009; Moe and 
Fader 2004).  Whilst popular media increasingly talk of the value of big data there is a 
need for a note of caution. The paper is set in the context of the music industry and 
highlights the need for managers and policy makers to question carefully any analysis 
presented to them and provides a set of questions to be addressed. 
 
Data and the Music Industry 
Market data from the music industry sector shows that total revenues have been in 
decline since the start of the twenty first century (IFPI, 2011; Liebowitz, 2008; Parry 
et al., 2012). The revenue decline coincides with the rise of the internet and digital 
formats for music. Two non-mutually exclusive explanations have been proposed in 
order to understand why revenues have been so drastically affected by digitization 
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(Bustinza et al., 2013). The first explanation has been named purchase substitution or 
sales displacement (Liebowitz, 2006) and proposes that consumers substitute legal 
purchases for illegal downloads through what is known as file sharing or pirating 
music. Illegal file sharing directly violates the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) of 
creators and distributors (Siwek, 2007). The second explanation deals with the 
difficulties of the music industry in adapting to the new digital requirements of its 
consumers, which implies that industry leaders need to innovate and find more 
suitable business models for the new market conditions (Teece, 2010). The file 
sharing explanation can be used directly in calls for politicians and governments to 
develop regulation, while the business model explanation requires the strategy leaders 
of the industry to adapt the market offerings. Understanding the nature of this dyad 
requires the determination of the extent of piracy, a non-trivial challenge for data 
scientists.  
Whilst music industry revenue has fallen during the internet revolution, the 
internet has also helped increase the availability of data about customers and their 
behaviour, facilitating empirical analysis. Over the last ten years different 
methodologies have been used to analyse the relationship between illegal file-sharing 
and purchasing activity. Three research methodologies have been employed to 
quantify piracy: aggregated data (Bustinza et al., 2013; Liebowitz, 2008); consumer 
survey data (Andersen et al., 2010; Chi, 2008; Hong, 2004; Rob and Waldfogel, 
2004; Zentner, 2006); and consumer transaction data (Aguiar and Martens, 2013; 
Battacharjee et al., 2007; Oberholzer and Strumpf, 2007). Of the ten empirical papers 
cited above six suggest illegal file sharing damages sales, as they find a negative 
relationship between file sharing and purchase behaviour. Three articles find no 
significant relationship between file sharing and purchasing behaviour (Andersen et 
al., 2010; Chi, 2008; Oberholzer & Strumpf, 2007). This leaves only one article 
showing a positive relationship between illegal file sharing and purchasing behaviour, 
that of Aguiar and Martens (2013) published by the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission. If the Aguiar and Martens (2013) finding is valid it has 
significant implications for both policy makers and industry managers; however, the 
work has been criticized by industry organizations, including IFPI and Hadopi 
(Hadopi 2013; IFPI 2013). The Aguiar and Martens study is analysed in depth in this 
article, which will demonstrate the caution required of managers and academics when 
Under consideration for publication in “Strategic Change” 
presented with reports based on large data sets which may be used to shape strategic 
and policy decisions. 
The research of Aguiar and Martens (2013), A&M thereafter, uses Nielsen 
Clickstream Data. This data captures mouse clicks, webpage URL, the time and 
length of page visit and a classification of the webpage according to its content. A&M 
analysis looks at the relationship between Internet clicks on illegal download website 
pages and clicks made by computer users on the webpages of music purchasing 
websites, which provides a new and potentially valuable methodological approach.  
The results and conclusions A&M draw from their analysis support the idea that 
piracy is good for the music industry. Piracy is a heavily debated topic in the creative 
industries and a suggestion that it is beneficial which is backed by empirical analysis 
undertaken by the EU Commission research centre is controversial and potentially 
damaging if untrue as it clearly suggests to industry that they should embrace piracy 
and to policy makers that they need not introduce antipiracy measures. The results of 
such analyses have significant political and industry implications and therefore they 
need to be robust and conclusive before managers’ act and politicians change existing 
regulation. The aim of this paper is to reveal to policy makers and industry 
stakeholders the weaknesses and biases of the theory and evidence which may be 
provided to them to inform their decisions and to highlight key areas to challenge and 
questions they may ask, taking the EU commission report produced by A&M as an 
example for critique. 
 
Theoretical weaknesses 
Economic issues 
Reports which present analysis of data are usually created around a scenario or 
context and the starting point of the A&M (2013) argumentation is based in 
economics. They define a system that, in the absence of file sharing, for a given price 
of goods, P0, consumers who’s valuation of the good is larger than the price (UH>P0) 
would make a purchase. Other consumers would decide not to purchase because their 
valuation is below the market price (UL<P0). With the appearance of a free alternative 
to achieve the same music good (PFS=0) a proportion of consumers with high 
valuation for music goods (λ*NH) and a proportion of those with a low valuation 
(γ*NL) will decide to move to file sharing sites, leaving a rate of sales displacement 
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of, by definition, a ratio between 0 and 1. A&M recognise at this point in their model 
that there is some degree of purchase substitution. In this framework the group of 
consumers who place a low valuation on the goods and who use illegal file sharing 
sites are not seen as problematic as they were not purchasers in the initial situation. 
Having been provided with a given initial situation/scenario by A&M it is important 
to ask: is their framework correct? what are their implicit assumptions?  
Under a common framework of price competition with homogeneous goods, 
Bertrand (1883) states that if only two firms compete in a market the equilibrium 
could be the same as that of perfect competition, which would be selling goods at a 
price that equals marginal cost. The marginal cost for a consumer of a downloaded 
file taken from a file-sharing network is assumed to be close to zero.  In the given 
competitive context incumbent music industry companies would go out of business as 
they could not survive if to compete they needed to make their output market price 
equal or lower than their marginal cost.  This situation would imply a sales 
displacement of one (λ=1). Therefore, if A&M consider that sales displacement could 
be smaller than one, they are assuming that file sharing sites and the music industry 
compete with heterogeneous goods. This is consistent with Casadesus-Masanell and 
Hervas-Drane (2010) who posit that commercial legal online content providers can 
optimize and deliver new experiences to consumers (i.e. speed, quality, fashion), 
which cannot be matched by decentralized, self-sustained P2P networks.  Therefore 
there is agreement in the literature with A&M that there is a degree of sales 
displacement and that file sharing sites and commercial music firms are providers of 
non-homogeneous goods and hence have different prices.  
However, there are issues around subsequent conclusions which are made based 
on this finding. A&M conclude that file sharing sites in the music industry increase 
welfare, converting some producer’s revenues into consumer surplus. Recently 
Greenstein and McDevitt (2011, p. 631) stated, “No careful method exists for 
calculating the consumer surplus for an unprized good with widespread user 
contributions”. The increase in welfare conclusion may not be directly derived as 
argued by A&M. In fact, such a conclusion would need two additional implicit 
assumptions to be made. Both the demand function (in the simplified framework 
defined by UH and UL) and price of commercial music must hold constant before and 
after the appearance of illegal file sharing networks (P0=P1). For instance if P0>P1 
consumers with UH would be likely to purchase more than they did previously and 
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some consumers who were previously in the UL group could be transformed into 
buyers. This would not necessarily be true if the utility of those consumers also 
decreased. For example, if a consumer found that many people had taken for free 
what they had paid for, they may lower the valuation they place on that good. This is 
an argument which is seated in the theory of positional goods (Frank, 1985).  
Positional goods are defined as those goods whose value depends upon how 
they are compared with things owned by others. Hence, a certain degree of 
uniqueness is a requirement for an increase in the value of a given positional good. 
When more of a good is made available, in the case of digital files a copy available on 
an illegal file sharing site, valuations fall. For digital copies of a file made available 
on illegal networks outside of controlled industry channels, supply becomes 
potentially infinite and this reduces the valuation and the willingness to pay of those 
consumers with initial high valuation (UH). Such a rise in supply volume could 
transform high valuation individuals into individuals with low valuation (UL). Figure 
1 provides a graphical example of what could be happening (without considering the 
consumer surplus of illegal downloads). If prices and willingness to pay have 
decreased then the consumer surplus has simply changed, but information is not 
available to identify if the surplus has increased or decreased. Whilst further 
investigation of the effect of illegal file sharing on consumer valuation is a matter for 
future research, the work shows that logical tests could reveal the potential weakness 
in conclusions and lead to further tests for robustness. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Innovation issues 
Digitization is seen as a disruptive innovation for many industries which significantly 
changes the nature of a firm’s value creating mechanisms (Christensen & Overdorf 
2000). To survive firms must innovate, creating new business models which raises a 
question related to the efficiency of the industry in implementing new models in order 
to re-engage consumers (Parry et al., 2012). In the particular context of the music 
industry a significant change in the business models driven by digital innovations is 
based upon the selling of individual songs online as opposed to selling a group of 
songs as an album, a phenomenon called unbundling. A&M suggest that unbundling 
permits the music industry to recover revenue as individuals not interested in albums 
may buy a greater number of single digital tracks. This proposition is not based upon 
a full analysis of literature as the proposed increase in revenue contradicts the findings 
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of one of the most cited papers in the field, Elberse (2010), not cited in A&M report. 
The evidence provided by Elberse comes from consumer transaction data provided by 
Nielsen SoundScan, the same provider of the A&M dataset, though not Clickstream 
as she instead uses information on dollar expenditure. Elberse found that the dollar 
amounts gained through song sales remain far below the level needed to offset the 
revenues lost due to lower album sales. The cost of bringing an individual song track 
to market is virtually the same as bringing an album to market (Rifkin, 2000) and 
coupled with evidence from literature challenges the A&M argument that music 
industry successfully reacted to file-sharing through offering new business models.  
The ability of incumbent firms to innovate, develop and deploy new business 
models to transition into the digital age is an on-going challenge and incumbents may 
not survive the transition (Ng, 2013). The ability to survive the transition to the digital 
age and the role of data will be the focus of future studies. 
 
Data construction issues 
When utilizing data sources it is important to consider the manner in which the data 
was collected and understand the impact that may have upon results and hence 
decisions. To collect clickstream data the user voluntarily installs a piece of software 
that tracks their behaviour (Moe and Fader, 2004). Installation of tracking software is 
not typical of consumers, so sample bias is arguably stronger than would be found in 
research based on consumer surveys.  Moreover, the individual is reminded that they 
are being observed every time they identify themselves on a machine via a login. 
External observation may change behaviour, a phenomena known as the Hawthorne 
effect (Simoff et al., 2008). Due to the monitoring, consumers with the software 
installed in one computer may well use another computer for private or illegal 
activity. These are important limitations of the use of clickstream or other data 
collected in this way. The implication for the A&M report is that illegal activity might 
be under-represented. 
Empirical researchers are very sensitive to sub-sample selection procedures and 
missing data managing (Denscombe, 2010). Those using data must examine the 
numbers given for data collected and data used and explore any discrepancy between 
the two. The methodology of A&M has severe limitations in this respect as the report 
states they have information for 25,000 Internet users but analysis only uses 
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information for a subsample of 16,290, effectively dropping relevant observations of 
8,710, 34.8% of the sample. Examination reveals that the data problem caused by the 
group of consumers excluded from the analysis is that they did not visit the webpages 
pre-selected by the researchers as sites for illegal downloading, legal streaming or 
legal purchase. The data analysis spread sheet for the ‘non-visiting’ consumers would 
have zeros within the cells related to them but these should not be treated as ‘missing 
data’, as these consumers were active online, just not within the boundaries set by the 
researchers. When interpreting results decision-makers and academics should always 
question why complete datasets were not used, what was done with the ‘missing’ data 
and why authors do not perform robustness tests with subsamples. 
The use of proxy variables is usual in quantitative methodologies when the 
variable of interest is not observable (Trenkler and Toutenburg, 1992). Proxy 
variables must always be treated with caution and their logic questioned. In this case 
A&M use clickstream data as a proxy for expenditure in digital stores. Taking this 
proxy is questionable as current research is still unclear as to consumer browsing 
behaviour within a website (Bucklin and Sismeiro, 2009) or predicting when 
consumer website visits convert into purchase (Moe and Fader, 2004). A first 
condition for using a proxy is that they must be positively correlated with the original 
variable. A&M do not provide evidence that clickstream data is positively correlated 
with purchasing. Indeed, there is some literature arguing that the value of a click 
differs between consumers so the conditional probability of purchasing after a click is 
not homogeneous in the sample. As an example Moe (2003) argues that there are four 
uses for clicks when navigating commercial websites: buying, browsing, searching, or 
knowledge building. This heterogeneity challenges the correlation of clicks with 
purchasing.  
Proxy variables employed may potentially include more information, relating 
them to more variables than that which was desired. For instance A&M (2013) use 
clicks as a proxy for music related browsing but state that they cannot differentiate 
“between the file sharing of music files and other types of files such as movies or 
books” (p.8). The problem with such a limit on a proxy variable used in analysis is 
that it would be possible to make assumptions about music without knowing if the 
individuals were interested in music, books or film. It is possible that the conclusion 
that there is a positive correlation between illegal downloading and purchasing of 
music is in reality based on individuals downloading movies illegally and purchasing 
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music. This kind of variable construction may be taken to invalidate credible 
interpretation of the parameters estimated as, from a given dataset, it is difficult to 
know what is happening. 
Further examining actual consumer behaviour, clickstream data is currently 
unable to provide information of consumer behaviour within large multi-offering 
websites like Amazon. It is important to recognise when data is interpreted and 
excluded, particularly when the data in question may be related to a large number of 
clicks or a significant firm in a market. A&M recognise this limitation and provide an 
interpretation in a footnote (p.7 in their report) where they argue that the inclusion of 
these clicks would produce a larger measure of the legal purchasing variable and 
hence they expect this effect to have downward bias on their estimates. This 
interpretation has an assumption of ‘purchase’ behaviour, but clickstream gives 
information of Internet usage not purchasing behaviour. For instance, the claim that 
their parameter is biased downwards, meaning that their estimated elasticity is smaller 
than actual, makes little statistical sense. There remains a possibility that those who 
purchase from Amazon are non-file sharers and if they were non-file sharers their 
parameter would be biased upwards, which could imply that the actual elasticity could 
be negative, as found in previous literature regarding purchase substitution 
(Liebowitz, 2006). The report accepts that their estimated elasticity is biased, but such 
claims of bias needs to be examined.  
 
Econometric issues  
Statistics can be misleading and it is important to ask if what is being claimed can be 
explained by the methodology used. In this regard, the purpose of correlation analysis 
is to measure and interpret the strength of a linear or nonlinear (e.g., exponential, 
polynomial, and logistic) relationship (Krzanowski, 2000) and not to analyse 
causality.  Correlation analysis can mislead at the time of making decisions. As an 
example, A&M offers the correlation matrix in Table 3. The correlation between 
clicks on purchasing websites and clicks on downloading sites is 0.0559. This 
parameter is significantly different from zero but it does not imply that there is a 
meaningful association between buying clicks and illegal downloading clicks as the 
value of the correlation coefficient is smaller than 0.2, which according to 
Krzanowski (2000) is the threshold for considering an association between variables 
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as economically relevant. The correlation of streaming and buying clicks is 0.3634 
and is statistically different from zero at 1%. According to Krzanowski (2000) this 
would be classified between weakly (0.2) and moderately (0.5) positive. To confirm 
this small association we calculate an approximation of the ratio of explained 
variance, or R2 of a model, where downloading clicks and streaming clicks are 
explanatory variables of buying clicks. 
Compared with Figure 1 of the A&M (2013) paper, where the different type of 
music consumers are showed in percentage terms, we are going to present one of the 
traditional analyses that must be undertaken after calculating a correlation matrix. To 
decide which variables should be evaluated for further inclusion in an analysis of 
causal relations it is necessary to calculate the  percentage of variance explained by 
each variable, as opposed to the percentage of people who belong to each group. In 
doing so we calculate partial correlations and semi-partial correlations by taking the 
correlation matrix of the paper:  
 
 
 
 
The unique variance will be (0.03886)2 = 0.0015. That value, 0.15%, is the 
unique variance explained by X1, the downloading variable.  Then, we can calculate 
common variance X1, X2 = (0.0559)2 - 0.0015 = 0.0016. If we do the same for X2, the 
streaming variable: 
 
 
 
The unique variance will be (0.36115)2 = 0.1304. That value, 13.04%, is the 
unique variance explained by X2, the streaming variable.  If we add these values we 
obtain the total variance explained (R2) by the variables downloading (unique 
variance 0.15%), streaming (unique variance 13.04%) plus the common variables 
between these variables (0.16%). Total variance explained (R2) is 
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0.15%+13.04%+0.16%= 13.35% (R2 = 0.1335). Variance unexplained by X1, X2 = 1-
0.1335=0.8665 (86.65%).   
This would imply that only 13.35% of the variation in the buying variable can 
be explained by the explanatory variables (streaming explains 13.04% and 
downloading only 0.15%). The remaining 86.65% can be attributed to unknowns, the 
lurking variables which are not discussed or apparent in the analysis or discussions. 
This approximation is close to the R2 reported in the A&M baseline model (Table 5, 
Column 1, R2=0.162), which includes some control variables such as personal 
characteristics and total time spent on the Internet.  Overall, through applying the 
process recommended by statistical manuals before carrying out a regression analysis, 
even in lognormal cases, the unique variance explained by the downloading variable 
is 0.15% (over 100% the variable explains only 0.15%). So, the variable can only 
explain a fraction of the purchasing behaviour observed. The value obtained for the 
downloading unique variance means that it is not recommended for inclusion due to 
the low prior predictive effect (See Hair et al., 2001). These calculations clarify the 
statistical appropriateness of the use of the variables, using a similar diagram as 
shown in Figure 2.  
[Insert Figure 2] 
Adoption of the wrong premise during analysis is not only a problem with 
regards the statistical appropriateness of the variables selected by A&M (2013). 
Another source of misleading results comes from the consistency between variables 
and the methodology used. Some measures require a more sophisticated method. For 
instance, clickstream data is not continuous; instead it is discrete and has a counting 
nature (number of clicks on purchasing websites) which must be treated with Poisson 
or Negative Binomial regression models. Again, A&M are imprecise in the method 
selected. In order to make the analysis more robust they must provide econometric 
models correcting for the nature of the dependent variable, in this case simply not 
taking logarithms in the dependent variable.  According to Figure 1 of A&M (2013) 
the dependent variable has 43.4% zeros. The fact that the sample has a large quantity 
of zeros may imply that in this case a Negative Binomial will outperform a Poisson 
regression (Greene, 2003).  
Analysis may have a direction as X may influence Y in one direction, we may 
also find Y may influence X in the counter direction. When considering information 
based upon analysis of data it is important to examine any relationships for 
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directionality.  The objective of the A&M (2013) paper is to analyze the “causal” 
relationship between illegal downloading and digital purchasing. They only analyze 
how piracy influences purchasing, not the relationship in the opposite direction, how 
purchasing influences piracy, and the acknowledged limitations in the report only 
touch upon this. To provide clarity on this point, the A&M results could be consistent 
with file sharers visiting purchasing websites to discover new music or to check some 
relevant information about a song they are searching for before moving to illegal 
websites to download music for free. The problem in the analysis is caused by reverse 
causality; they do not provide empirical evidence that someone clicking on an illegal 
download websites did not first go to a legal digital purchase site.  
Let us present the problem more formally based on Wooldridge (2002) and 
Stock and Watson (2012) and discussed in depth by Visnjic and Van Looy (2013). 
A&M acknowledge an important source of endogeneity; missing variable syndrome. 
The missing variables may be correlated with both error terms, dependent variable 
(clicks on purchasing sites) and independent variable (clicks on illegal download 
sites). This results in endogeneity and means the parameters used are biased and 
inefficient. Another common cause of correlation between the error terms and the 
independent variables that generates endogeneity is the presence of simultaneous 
causality. This is not acknowledged by A&M and it is complex to deal with. 
Econometricians recommend using the instrumental variables approach to avoid 
simultaneous causality (Sargan, 1958). The instrumental variables approach is a 
system of equations where the (endogenous) independent variable is first ‘regressed’ 
on another variable (named the ‘instrument’), which is used to explain the 
independent variable and is unrelated to the dependent variable. Instruments are 
‘strong’ when they can sufficiently explain the independent variable and are 
‘independent’ or ‘exogenous’ when they are unrelated to the error term and the 
dependent variable. Managers must take care when presented with analysis which 
uses instruments. Finding a strong instrument is challenging as, due to the 
idiosyncratic nature of independent variables, there is limited theory available as to 
how to select appropriate instruments (Wooldridge, 2012). 
 
Integrating the results of previous empirical literature 
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It is important to sense check findings against other work. One way of doing this is to 
compare the aggregate values of the variables at country level. In a recent article 
published by Bustinza et al. (2013) the country reported to have the highest piracy 
rate in the sample studied was Spain (44% of population) and the country with the 
lowest piracy was Germany (14%). The findings are consistent with the results found 
in the A&M clickstream sample, in which Spain has 10.38 clicks per person and 
Germany 6.24 clicks per person. Other similarities with previous research are found 
in the relationships between working status and gender and illegal downloading. For 
example Cox (2012, p.162) found that females and individuals who have a high 
income are less likely to pirate music than males and the unemployed. These 
similarities imply that Clickstream measurements show a high degree of consistency 
with sources based on consumer surveys. However, as commented upon in the 
introduction the A&M (2013) analysis is the only publication from literature known 
to the authors which finds a positive relationship between illegal downloading and 
purchasing. This relationship is country specific as the elasticity is close to zero in 
Spain and Italy, and close to 0.04 in France or UK. This implies that an increase in 
1% of the clicks on illegal downloading websites will correspond to clicks in 
purchasing websites increasing by 0.04% in the UK and France but will not change 
the click count in Spain and Italy, the countries with the higher piracy levels. The data 
presents a form of inverse relationship between levels of piracy and legally buying 
music, see Figure 3 for a test of this negative relation. The A&M proposition is that 
countries with lower piracy levels could somehow benefit from piracy but this benefit 
disappears when the country piracy level is high, such as in Italy or Spain. In others 
words, the lower the level of piracy in a country, the stronger the positive impact of 
piracy on sales will be. By setting the value of piracy at 0% it can be shown that the 
predicted elasticity would be 0.0574, suggesting that piracy could be beneficial for 
those countries with low piracy and piracy could have a negative effect for those 
countries with high piracy rates, those larger than 0.0574/0.1177 = 48.77%.   
[Insert Figure 3] 
Given piracy rates on a longitudinal basis it is possible to estimate the elasticity 
at country level. To test this analysis estimated figures for piracy and sales were 
requested from the industry body, IFPI. This data was provided for the period 2010-
2012. Piracy rates were provided at monthly level while sales were available only at 
year level. To combine both datasets piracy rates were transformed to year level using 
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an average of the monthly piracy rates. Using this data an estimate of the elasticity for 
the years 2011 and 2012 is made, or assuming that the piracy requires two periods to 
impact on sales, just elasticity for 2012. 
Estimation of 1 year elasticity (t) = (Ln (salest) – Ln (Salest-1))/ (Piracyt – Piracyt-1)    
(1) 
Estimation of 2 year elasticity (t) =  (Ln (salest) – Ln (Salest-2))/ (Piracyt – Piracyt-2)   
(2) 
Table 1 shows the results of this estimation of elasticity for each country. This 
methodology has limitations, but the results are purely to illustrate how such an 
analysis may contradict the results of A&M (2013). Results of this new analysis show 
a negative elasticity for countries with low piracy (Germany) and positive elasticity 
for countries with high piracy (Spain).  
[Insert Table 1] 
It is possible to estimate the average elasticity using the model presented in 
Equation 3, where α is the constant and β is the average elasticity for our sample, 
which covers the period 2010-2012.  
Ln (salesit) = α + β*(Piracyit) + εit    (3) 
Table 2 presents the value and significance of the parameter β subject to 
different specifications. The baseline model is the pooled estimation, which 
corresponds to Equation 3, and reports a negative elasticity of -0.082, a result 
significant at 1%. This result implies that on average an increase of 1% in the piracy 
rate of a given country will reduce its industry sales in 0.082%. According to the 
likelihood ratio test provided in the last column the models containing year dummies 
and country specific information (in this case measured by country legal origin) do 
not have significantly more capacity to explain the variance of the dependent variable. 
Result reported in Figure 3, Table 1 and Table 2 comes from a very small sample and 
results cannot be conclusive. However, they can be seen as a guide for future research 
on the topic.    
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Key questions   
Computer storage capacity and the ubiquitous nature of the Internet are allowing 
industry and academics to collect increasingly large datasets, at low cost, and then 
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analyse the data to help guide strategy (Strategic Direction, 2013). Clickstream, a data 
source that collects information on the navigation patterns of Internet users through 
the ‘clicks’ they make on website, is a good example. However, strategy makers must 
take great care when presented with statistical analysis of datasets. There are many 
potential errors which may be made in good faith in reports and which careful 
analysis, logical tests or questions can identify.  For instance, individual actions 
captured in clickstream data are valuable for identifying general patterns of Internet 
users but have important limitations when related to predictability of purchasing 
behavior. In particular, we recommend decision makers assure that the following 
questions are adequately addressed in any analysis reported: 
• What is the scenario presented? 
o Is the framework correct? 
o What are the implicit assumptions? 
• Are logical weaknesses apparent when conclusions are applied to practical 
examples? 
o Are further tests for robustness of conclusions required and available? 
• Does the analysis draw on all the current work in the field? 
o Are there any important omissions? 
• How was the data collected? 
o What impact may the method of data collection have upon results? 
• Was all the data collected used? 
o Why were subsets unused? 
o How much data was classed as ‘missing’? 
o What was done with ‘missing’ data? 
o Were all ‘missing data’ treated equally? 
• Are there claims of bias in the data or findings? 
o Can they be examined and explained? 
• Were direct measurements or proxy variables used? 
o Do proxy variables also encompass other factors and if so what is the effect? 
• Are the correlations significant? 
o What is the percentage of variance explained by each variable? 
o How much do the variables explain variance and how much of the variance 
is unknown? 
• Is the method of analysis suitable for the type of dependent variable used? 
• Is causality between variables demonstrated? 
o Are instrumental variables used? 
o Is confidence high that the instruments are strong? 
• Does directionality exist in analysis? 
o If A influence on B is considered, has the influence of B on A also been 
considered? 
• Are the variables measurement and results consistent with previous empirical 
research? 
 
Concluding remarks 
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In this work we have provided an in depth analysis of the report published by Aguiar 
and Martens (2013), who provides some insights into the music industry. Their 
publication has created much online discussion and industrial organizations including 
IFPI and Hadopi have written critiques of the work (Hadopi 2013; IFPI 2013) as it is 
the first work concluding that piracy is positively linked to purchasing. The 
weaknesses throughout their empirical analysis undermine the validity of the claims 
made in the work. Through our analysis we identify a set of questions which may be 
used to test any analysis presented. If A&M had chosen to publish their work in a peer 
reviewed academic journal they may have been subjected to more rigorous review 
and these weaknesses challenged before public release. We would suggest that 
authors, who released their work through formats such as the European Commission 
publications recognize that their work will have impact for policy and industry. In 
publishing findings which have clear implications for industry and policy makers, 
authors have a duty of care over the validity and robustness of their work and should 
more clearly state the limitations of their empirical analysis. A&M caveat “we cannot 
draw policy implications” (p3) brings into question the authors understanding of the 
potential impact of their publication.  
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Figure 1. Consumer surplus before and after the introduction of file sharing sites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of the Variance of the dependent variable explained by 
independent variables 
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Figure 3. The negative relation between piracy rate and download-purchasing 
elasticity 
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Table 1. Estimated elasticity between piracy rate and sales at 1 and 2 years 
Countryyear 1 year elasticity 2 year elasticity 
UK2011 0.063  
UK2012 -0.459 0.127 
Germany2011 -0.007  
Germany2012 -0.044 -0.177 
France2011 0.022  
France2012 -0.132 0.024 
Italy2011 0.035  
Italy2012 0.015 0.010 
Spain2011 0.004  
Spain2012 0.020 0.006 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Estimating the average elasticity 
Specification β – Elasticity R2 Lrtest 
Pool estimation -0.082*** 74.35% --- 
Year fixed effects -0.084*** 76.66% chi2(2)= 1.4 
Year fixed effects and French legal origin 
dummy 
-0.064*** 80.88% chi2(3)= 4.4 
Level of statistical significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
 
 
